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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – STATE’S CONCIOUS INDIFFERENCE  
TO DEFENDANT’S PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 
 
Summary 
An appeal addressing whether the State’s failure to oppose a defendant’s motion to dismiss 
constitutes a conscious indifference to a defendant’s procedural right to defend the charge in a 
timely manner. 
Disposition 
The Court held that a conscious indifference analysis is appropriate where the State’s failure to 
oppose the defendant’s motion to dismiss results in the dismissal of the criminal complaint.  To 
demonstrate conscious indifference, the defendant need not show that the State acted 
intentionally.  Conscious indifference is a factual analysis and under the facts of this case, the 
State acted with conscious indifference by failing to comply with important procedural rules. 
Therefore, the Stated forfeited the opportunity to charge Woods again for the same offense.   
Factual and Procedural History 
The State charged William Woods with one count of sex offender failure to notify appropriate 
agencies of a change of address
2
 and the justice court set a preliminary hearing for November 19, 
2009.  At the hearing, Woods’ attorney, Karla A. Butko, served the prosecutor with a motion to 
dismiss. The prosecutor present at the hearing, Michael Mahaffey, was standing in for Deputy 
District Attorney Patricia Halstead, the prosecutor assigned to the case.  In light of the motion to 
dismiss, the parties agreed to postpone the preliminary hearing to allow the State time to file an 
opposition to the motion.   When the State failed to timely oppose the motion to dismiss, the 
justice court granted Woods’ motion and dismissed the case.  After learning of the dismissal, 
Halstead filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal.  The justice court ordered the State 
to file the opposition, but later dismissed the case again when it determined it lacked jurisdiction 
after the original dismissal. 
On March 10, 2010, the State obtained an indictment against Woods for the same offense 
charged in the criminal complaint.  Woods filed  a  pretrial  petition  for  a  writ  of  habeas  
corpus  and/or  motion  to dismiss the indictment alleging, inter alia, that the State willfully 
failed to comply  with  important  procedural  rules  and  acted  with  conscious indifference to 
his procedural rights when it failed to oppose the motion to dismiss.  This conscious indifference, 
he argued,  barred  a  subsequent prosecution for the same offense.  After a hearing, the district 
court denied the petition, concluding that the State’s action, or inaction, did not constitute willful 
or conscious indifference to Woods’ rights. Woods was subsequently convicted  of  sex  offender  
failure  to  notify appropriate agencies of change of address.  The appeal followed. 
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 Discussion 
The Supreme Court of Nevada issued a per curiam opinion. 
I. Whether the conscious indifference analysis applies to the facts present in this case. 
The Supreme Court of Nevada first announced the conscious indifference rule in 1970,  holding  
that  "[a]  new  proceeding  for  the  same  offense (whether by complaint, indictment or 
information) is not  allowable when the original proceeding has been dismissed due to the willful 
failure of the prosecutor to  comply with important procedural rules.”3 Originally, the rule served 
mainly to limit prosecutors’ use of requests for continuances in criminal proceedings. However, 
the Court applied the analysis in other contexts as well, including, among other cases, Johnson v. 
State, where the Court applied a conscious indifference analysis when the State failed to 
corroborate the testimony of appellant's  accomplice.
4
 The Court determined that the conscious 
indifference analysis was appropriate under the facts in this case. 
II. Whether the  district  court  abused its discretion  by  denying  his  pretrial  petition  for  
a  writ  of habeas  corpus because  the  State's  failure  to  oppose  his  motion  to  dismiss  
constituted willful or conscious indifference to his procedural rights. 
The Court defined conscious indifference as “conscious indifference to a  defendant's  procedural  
rights,  or  ‘willful  failure  of the  prosecution  to comply with important  procedural  rules.’”5  
Conscious indifference is not limited to intentional acts or acts committed with “calculated bad 
faith.”6 
Despite the unorthodox service of the motion to dismiss (delivered to the stand-in prosecutor) 
and the State’s timely motion for reconsideration of the dismissal, the State clearly failed to 
comply with an important procedural rule. The State was personally served with Woods’ motion 
to dismiss and was fully aware that failure to oppose could be  construed  as  an  admission that  
the  motion  had  merit  and  consent  to  grant  the  motion.  In addition, the State offered no 
explanation for its failure to oppose and no evidence of extraordinary circumstances leading to 
the failure to oppose.  Accordingly, the State acted with conscious indifference to Woods’ 
procedural rights. 
Conclusion 
The Court found that the district court erred when it denied Woods’ pretrial motion for habeas 
corpus and/or to dismiss.  The State was willfully and consciously indifferent to Woods’ 
procedural rights a when it failed to oppose Woods’ motion to dismiss and which subsequently 
resulted in the dismissal of the case.  Because the State exhibited conscious indifference and the 
case was dismissed, the State cannot subsequently prosecute Woods for the original offense.  The 
Court reversed the conviction.  
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